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DLD-016        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











GLENN A. GRANT, ACTING ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NEW 
JERSEY COURTS; STUART RABNER, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE NEW JERSEY 
SUPREME COURT; CARMEN MESSANO, PRESIDING JUDGE FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATION FOR THE APPELLANT DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF NEW JERSEY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01587) 
District Judge:  Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or Possible 
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 22, 2020 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 






Appellant Robert Browning, proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action 
naming as defendants the Acting Administrative Director of the New Jersey Courts, the 
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the Presiding Judge for the 
Administration of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.  In his 
complaint, he challenged the denial of an application for post-conviction relief he filed in 
state court after pleading guilty in a criminal case, as well as a civil judgment secured 
against him, apparently in relation to his criminal case.  For relief, he stated his desire to 
withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.  The District Court screened the complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),1 and entered a summary order dismissing the 
complaint without prejudice on the ground that Browning’s § 1983 claims were barred by 
judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.  Browning timely appealed.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the action. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Our standard of review is plenary, 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), and we construe Browning’s pro se 
 
1 The District Court also referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the screening statute for 
complaints filed by prisoners, but it does not appear that Browning was a prisoner when 
he filed his complaint.  Section 1915(e)(2)(B) clearly authorized the District Court’s 
screening here. 
 
2 “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 
appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 




complaint liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We 
may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
The complaint and Browning’s filings in this Court indicate that he is seeking to 
vacate his underlying conviction.  Any request that a federal court overturn a state-court 
conviction must be brought in a habeas corpus petition, not a § 1983 action.  See Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); cf. Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cnty., 804 F.3d 338, 
345 n.12 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that plaintiff “who had no recourse under the habeas 
statute was nevertheless subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule”).  Further, 
Browning has named as defendants only judges, and “in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive 
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Browning has not shown that the exception to the 
general bar on injunctive relief applies.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
Browning argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his complaint based 
on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity because he did not sue the defendants in their 
capacities as judges, but rather “as administrators whose policies, rules, and procedures 
 
curiam).  However, such an order will be final and appealable if the plaintiff “declares his 
intention to stand on his complaint.”  Id. at 952.  Here, Browning expressly indicated his 




denied [him] [his] right to trial.”  Even assuming these allegations could circumvent 
judicial immunity, the complaint’s allegations that the defendants “are each 
Administrators and rule makers in the NJ Judicial branch,” and that “[t]heir rules denied 
[him] [his] constitutional right” were conclusory and factually barren, and thus failed to 
state a claim.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).   
Accordingly, the complaint was properly dismissed, and we will summarily 
affirm. 
 
